Information

Is there a place where I can find inconsistent images?

Is there a place where I can find inconsistent images?


We are searching data for your request:

Forums and discussions:
Manuals and reference books:
Data from registers:
Wait the end of the search in all databases.
Upon completion, a link will appear to access the found materials.

I would like to find some images in which there are logical inconsistencies. I want to use them for practicing my attention towards those kinds of logical errors (so that I could more easily spot them in my dreams, I am not sure if this works, but I just want to test.). I remember back in the high school someone showed me a picture where one is supposed to find such logical inconsistencies and picture included shadows facing wrong directions, things affected by winds in different directions etc.


The University of Adelaide has a lot of information concerning inconsistent images:

http://www.hss.adelaide.edu.au/philosophy/inconsistent-images/

There are also a few of those on this page:

http://www.hss.adelaide.edu.au/philosophy/inconsistent-images/galleries/#sl


Neurological Rehabilitation

Paul J. Eslinger , . Freeman M. Chakara , in Handbook of Clinical Neurology , 2013

Social cognition and theory of mind

In several EF models, social cognition is considered an important dimension that incorporates interpersonal processes such as theory of mind and empathy. Since such processes require problem solving such as inferential and relational reasoning , decision-making, and context-specific rules and actions, there is a substantial role for EF resources in the acquisition and application of social knowledge and actions, hence the term social executors ( Eslinger et al., 1995 ). Although assessment instruments for social cognition are fairly limited, there has been gradual emergence of standardized measures and behavioral inventories to provide clinicians with a combination of objective and survey measures. These measures have become increasingly important because of the puzzling dissociations that may be evident after orbitofrontal lesions that leave measured intellect (and even EF measures described above) unaffected but profoundly impair social adaptation in real-world settings. This gap can be addressed by some of the following measures and inventories:

Theory of Mind: First and second order beliefs in theory of mind vignettes that require judgment of what an individual is thinking in a particular situation (first order belief), and what another person believes that individual is thinking when he is and is not privy to certain situational information (second order beliefs).

Social Judgment: Guilford's Cartoon Predictions test is an example of presenting a social dilemma in pictured cartoon form, with patients required to choose the next most likely (appropriate) action to solve the dilemma from among three choices ( Eslinger et al., 2007 ).

Empathy: The Interpersonal Reactivity Index ( Davis, 1994 ) provides a standardized survey measure of cognitive (i.e., perspective-taking) and affective (emotional concern/sharing) realms of empathy.


Discussion

The results of Experiment 1 indicate that observers process scene semantics, even when doing so is irrelevant to their task. As mentioned earlier, scene semantics are irrelevant for the completion of this search task because, first, the identity of the scene does not provide information about the position of the target. Second, the visual dissimilarity between critical objects and the target minimizes the need to fully identify the objects. On top of object and scene identification, object and scene identities need to be integrated to affect behavior another processing step that would seem unnecessary or even counterproductive because object–scene relations are irrelevant to the letter search and the instruction is to search fast. Following the logic that both identification and integration are necessary to notice a scene-object mismatch, we assume that longer gaze durations on semantically inconsistent objects (i.e., mismatches) are a good indicator that scene as well as object identity processing are taking place. Participants spent more time fixating the semantically inconsistent objects than the consistent objects. This is reflected in longer total dwell times, more fixations, and longer mean fixation durations. The difference between conditions was not reflected in RTs, even though numerically RTs were on average prolonged by about 250 ms. Varying complexity and clutter in the scene, plus varying conspicuity of the target from scene to scene, might cause variance in target-absent decision times (Wolfe, 2012) larger than differences because of object consistency.

In this experiment we were mostly interested in measures upon object fixation. An ongoing debate in scene-perception literature concerns whether semantically inconsistent objects also attract gaze, indicating semantic processing in visual periphery. Even though we find earlier first fixations of semantically inconsistent objects, we refrain from drawing strong conclusions from this about attention attraction because the stimuli used were not controlled for distance to the initial fixation dot. In addition, critical objects were relatively large and therefore more easily recognizable in the visual periphery, even when further away from initial fixation.

After experimental sessions, as a check of how noticeable the semantic inconsistencies had been to participants during their search task, we asked each participant, “Did you notice anything?” Most responded that there were “odd objects” in some of the images. When asked how many they had noticed, most participants indicated “a few” or named one or two examples. In Experiment 2, we aimed to get a better grip on how noticeable the semantic inconsistencies were to participants by testing their memory for the critical objects.


This Is Why You Need a "Happy Place"—and Where to Find It

Finding yourself feeling less-than-thrilled with your lot in life is hardly unique. In fact, according to the results of the 2016 Harris Poll Happiness Index, just 31 percent of Americans considered themselves "very happy." However, it's not just a tumultuous political climate or stagnant wages bringing people down: in many cases, it's a lack of optimism about what the future might hold. And while adding zeroes to that paycheck may not be a possibility, there's one simple way to improve your life in an instant: find your happy place.

According to licensed mental health counselor and life coach Dr. Jaime Kulaga, Ph.D., there are few stressors you can't fix if you find your happy place.

"Having a space that you can go to, to center and find clarity, is extremely beneficial. When you step away to a calm space that brings you joy or peacefulness, you allow your mind to destress so that you can make clear minded decisions and see things from alternate perspectives," she says. "Another benefit to having a place where you can escape is that you allow yourself to be more present in the moment. Being present often welcomes in thoughts of gratitude. Gratitude increases overall life happiness and minimizes anxieties and anger."

Here's where things get interesting: Your happy place doesn't even need to be real. If you've got a perfect cabin on a scenic bluff overlooking the ocean that sets your mind right—or even just a bench in a nearby garden where you can cool your head—that's great. But your happy place can merely be an imagined place that exists in your mind—and conjuring images of being there can boost your mood in mere seconds.

According to a study published in the Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, thinking of traveling to a fantastical location and merely planning such a trip in your head can actually increase your happiness more than reminiscing about the actual vacation afterward—suggesting that the fantasy is frequently all you need to make yourself happier in no time.

Here's how to do it

"Start with listing out dreams and goals, and go big," suggests Dr. Kulaga. "Want that bungalow, overlooking crystal clear water with palm trees that have coconuts you drink from? Great! Dream it up. Or, is your dream to walk across a university stage, while hundreds of people are screaming your name and jumping up and down for you as you grab your hard-earned diploma from the Dean of a school? Great! Dream it up. Your happy place is subjective. It is a place that makes your mind smile, calm down, and feel positive. It is a place that is safe, secure, and problem free."

It's not a waste of time. In fact, there could be real health benefits. According to a study published in Evidence-based Complementary and Alternative Medicine, more individuals undergoing chemotherapy who did guided meditations and similar visualization exercises had more improved outcomes than those who didn't. Among the most notable results of the study? While stress continued to increase over the course of treatment among those who didn't participate in these activities, it continued to plummet among those who did. Perhaps more surprising: those who performed the visualization exercises actually experienced less fatigue over the course of treatment, too.

Even if it feels silly to encourage those flights of fancy and retreat to your happy place now, Dr. Kulaga suggests that people don't discount what a positive direction doing so might take your life in. "Know that anything is possible and your 'happy place' can become your permanent reality in this lifetime," she says.

And for more genius ways to lift your spirits, see these 20 Top Tricks from Therapists on Finding Happiness.

To discover more amazing secrets about living your best life, click here to follow us on Instagram!


Is there a place where I can find inconsistent images? - Psychology

.- The mysteries of the human mind .

- Los misterios de la mente humana.

There is no light at the edge of darkness.

for Our Daily Challenge topic - 'Science.' I will get better pix at end of day. Below shows last year day after I bought it. You can read parts of brain better

It's a pretty hot day outside, temperature being at 39°C. I had been reading biochemistry and also planning to read "Like the Flowing River". Anyway, I had also been researching on empathy and clinical depression.

I wish you well and I hope you are having a great day.

This morning i just couldn’t think of anything clever or amusing for the write up for this piece, so whilst racking my brain I thought i’d have a quick trawl of the interweb to see if i could find any inspiration. It wasn’t looking great until I came across an article about google’s new poetry AI and that's when things started to fall into place. So instead of some well thought out prose I give you some poetry created by a computer after a little nudge in the right direction by myself. I hope you enjoy:

First I fell into an idle bed

Drowning all a feeling with a think

To breathe those flowers upon my head.

He knew that an artist, an marked school,

Brought on its heart, like the distant dew

As if a dog I might paint a fool?

Now if that doesn’t strike a chord i’m pretty sure you are dead inside.

Sometimes. relationships get ill. This is to reflect that part in some that lives through another. Separation, in this case, is the equivalent of death.

As featured in EXPLORE 17 January 2015. Woo!

Making up an interesting title for an image can be an important creative aspect of photography. After all, did famous photographers ever resort to generic or bland labels for their work, or no names at all?

Actually, they often did. Real ordinary titles like “East Coast Fisherman,” “White Radish,” “Nude, Campden Hill, London, 1949,” and simply “Self-portrait.”

So how come these really creative people failed to conjure up a captivating title for some of their most famous photographs? Well, probably because it wasn’t necessary. The image itself was meaningful, powerful, revealing, all on its own. Maybe all they felt they needed to do was indicate the simple facts of where, when, and who, in order to provide a basic context. Then the image did the rest of the talking.

There are some definite advantages to straightforward or no titles at all. It lets viewers explore the image on their own without forcing any particular interpretation. It tosses the image into their lap and encourages them to project themselves into it, creating their own meaning. No title at all can be especially effective. It’s mysterious. It teases, frustrates, challenges, lures the viewer in: “Go ahead. Figure this out.” It’s a presentation of the purely visual with no pretense of words.

On the other hand, titles of some kind are useful handles. Without one, how do you refer to an image? “It’s the shot of the bicycle, not the bicycle in the playground… the other one, you know, the bicycle on the grass, shot from below, through the spokes up at the sky.”

Wouldn’t “Spoked Sky” be easier? Especially in online photo sharing communities, where there are thousands and millions of images, titles will help you organize, identify, and discuss images, as well as make it easier for search engines to find them.

And like I said at the start, titles can be an important part of the creative process. You can use a title to steer the viewer towards ideas that you really want to convey. The title can add a layer of meaning that is not immediately obvious in the photo. A title can even be playful or provocative by contradicting the qualities of the image.

Some titles might pop into your mind right away. You know what the image says for you. In other cases, however, you might have to really think about it. That process can be fascinating, and valuable. You know you like the photo, but may not be sure why. Searching your mind for a title might clarify that for you. It may help you uncover the subconscious feelings, memories, and fantasies that you associate with it. Coming up with a really good title might also help you alter and refine the photo. The title gives you a direction for post processing and image manipulation. It’s an excellent exercise in bringing composition in line with the idea you want to convey.

You’ll know when you have a really good title. It feels right. It “sticks.” Weeks, months, even years later, you’ll remember it. It’s a wedding of meaning and image.

* This image and essay are part of a book on Photographic Psychology that I’m writing within Flickr. Please see the set description.

Yesterday was tee shirt weather. Today it’s cold enough outside that you can see your breath. Even so, the warm colors of spring tulips add a psychology of warmth that’s unmistakable!

Life University (LIFE) believes that in order to educate people, you have to do more than just feed their intellect or teach them critical thinking skills. Additionally, they believe that you have to teach them how to be better human beings by cultivating skills such as emotion regulation.

It's usually next to impossible to get a good photo of my grandson. He can't sit still, and tends to frown at the camera. Until I tried to get a portrait of his mom for work purposes and he decided, of course, he just had to get in there.

Also known as “multiplicity” shots, images involving clones can be comical, intriguing, and even disturbing. As highly self-aware creatures, we humans are fascinated by mirrors and reflections of ourselves, by the idea of having a twin, alter ego, doppleganger, and multiple personalities.

The multiplicity shot is a visual representation of the fact that the psyche is not a homogenously unified entity. The human personality is made up of various parts that sometimes cooperate with each other, and sometimes not. Clone images capture the various ways these different elements of the psyche might interact - what some psychologists call “intrapsychic dynamics.” For example:

- The hidden, unconscious, or dissociated parts of ourselves that operate behind the scenes or behind our backs, without our even being aware of their existence

- The unconscious self that suddenly and unexpected appears, much to our surprise, delight, or shock (see The Unconscious)

- The self that we wish or fear to be

- The contradictions, divisions, or opposites within our psyche

- The “evil” or aggressive qualities within, that we usually suppress

- The parts of ourselves that are in conflict with each other, that oppose, thwart or resist each other (see Inside the Psyche)

- The unknown part of our psyche that acts as a “trickster” who creates unpredictability in our lives (see Prankster)

- The inner wise self that wants to help us, perhaps even the “God within”

- Self acceptance, self love, or narcissism

- Inner confusion and chaos created by ambitions, feelings, and thoughts that are at odds with each other

- The inner parts of our psyche that cooperate with each other, work in unison or in parallel with each other, perhaps aware or unaware of each other’s presence (see Biography)

- The self that is simply aware of itself, of the process of observing itself, perhaps with judgment, or, in a mystical fashion, without any judgment or evaluation (see Infinite Progression)

Multiplicity images tend to be more convincing and intriguing when the clones visibly demonstrate this awareness of and interaction with each other. Otherwise the clones appear as unrelated, somewhat uninteresting duplications of each other. Body language and line of sight can suggest a bond among them, although direct eye-to-eye contact can be difficult to simulate. Humans are exquisitely sensitive to the eyes, so if the eye connection among clones is off, even just a little, the viewer will notice and feel that the simulation is false. The most convincing clones are those that overlap, touch, or engage each other physically, although this effect requires careful planning in the shooting of the photos and skillful editing of the composite image.

One strategy for creativity multiplicity images is rather straightforward. Set the camera on a steady surface, preferably a tripod, and shoot the same scene several times over, each time with the subject in a different pose within that scene and in the spot where you want that subject to appear within the final composite image. In a photo editing program, choose one of the shots as a background, then copy just the subjects from the other shots and paste them into their position in the background photo. The tricky part will be the editing of the edges around the clones so that they blend convincingly into the background photo. Also pay close attention to the shadows cast by the clones. Inconsistent or missing shadows will result in an unrealistic final image. Scenes with even or diffuse, steady light will usually result in fewer complications. Poor edge editing, changing light sources, and problematic shadows will produce anomalous clones that look like they were just pasted into the scene.

In the image at the top of this page, which clones appear least convincing as natives of that shot, and why? Can you guess which one wasn’t cut and pasted?

* This image and essay are part of a book on Photographic Psychology that I’m writing within Flickr. Please see the set description.


6. General Discussion

Due to social updating, an agent who starts out with a consistent theory about the world may arrive at the inconsistent theory. Even if maintaining consistency at all times is too demanding for non-ideal beings to qualify as a necessary condition for rationality (Cherniak, 1986), it is presumably something that rational beings should aim for. This may suggest that social updating is a vice, from the perspective of rationality. However, in our first study (Wenmackers et al., 2012) we computed the probability for an agent to update to the inconsistent theory and found it to be non-zero, but relatively small (lower than 2%) moreover, it can be made arbitrarily low by strategically varying the model parameters.

Our current study of the opinion dynamics on the belief space reveals another virtue of the social updating process: even if an agent starts out at the inconsistent theory, the agent's opinion may change—to one of the consistent theories𠅍ue to the social update rule. This could already be seen on the basis of Example 3.2, but the results depicted in Figure 6 give more systematic information in this respect: except for the rightmost edge and its two vertices, all the opinion profiles in the presented face of the tetrahedron contain at least one agent who starts out at the inconsistent theory. Nevertheless, when there is any dynamics at all, many of these opinion profiles evolve to different profiles, some of which have no agents at the inconsistent theory. This is true, in particular, for all the opinion profiles in the blue and green areas, which act as basins for consensus positions on consistent theories.

We have given a probabilistic interpretation of the results on the belief space (OPS and ODS). We have seen that in the limit for an infinite population size and for large BCIs (D = wM), the relative importance of unstable equilibria vanishes. For M = 1 and D = 2, the probability of arriving at a population-wide consensus on some theory is unity. In particular, the probability of arriving at a population-wide consensus on the inconsistent theory is 1/4. Once the agents reach consensus on the inconsistent theory, there will be no further dynamics, because all consensus positions are fixed points. Hence, this result may be regarded as a worst case. However, this case study is highly unrealistic for (at least) three reasons.

First, the assumption of a uniform prior on the opinion profiles does not apply to real cases. Observe that if the agents were to pick out their initial theory at random, the distribution of initial anonymous opinion profiles would be higher around the center of the belief space. (For larger populations, there are more combinations of individual theories that lead to an anonymous opinion profile, in which all theories are represented almost evenly.) More importantly, however, we do not expect the agents to adopt an initial theory at random but rather to possess some prior knowledge, such that the distribution of their initial theories is clustered around the true theory (which is necessarily a consistent one). Hence we also expect a preferential position of the opinion profiles in a region around consensus on the true theory. For this reason, investigation of a more complex model, based on a variant of our current update rule (EHK), but including evidence-gathering as well as social updating, is high on our to-do list.

Second, in many practical situations relevant population sizes tend to be small (just think of the last meeting you attended), such that the infinite population limit does not apply well to them. In smaller populations, the relative importance of unstable equilibria (which do not lead to consensus) is more pronounced.

Third, modeling belief states as theories of the world only has practical relevance when M > 1, for which the relative size of the basins associated with consensus positions decreases rapidly (as 1/tM).

For all these reasons, we estimate the probability of arriving at a consensus on the inconsistent theory to be very small in a realistic setting—in any case well below 1/4.

The mechanism for social updating may also be criticized in the following way. If agents' belief states are theories, their beliefs are closed under the consequence relation. So, illustrating with theories for the case of M = 1 (cf. Example 3.2), an agent whose belief state is characterized by the string 1100 is supposed to believe also the propositions coded as 1110, 1101, and 1111. This is not reflected in our current update rule (EHK) and suggests an asymmetric composition of the peer group: for M = 1 and D = 1, an agent A with theory 1111 and an agent B with theory 1100 are not each other's peers according to our current model. However, agent B also ought to believe A's theory, but not vice versa. We may now suggest an alternative way of determining an agent's peer group: by taking into account also those agents that hold a theory which is within distance D of at least one of the consequences of the first agent's theory. Doing so would help to protect agents against updating to the inconsistent theory. However, it also introduces a preference for less informative theories, so it may hamper the agents' chances of finding the (strongest) true theory. Hence, this is a case where different epistemic goals (rationality versus finding the truth) are in direct conflict with each other and selecting the optimal normative model seems to require meta-norms of rationality.

In our previous work (Wenmackers et al., 2012), we have considered the probability of arriving at an opinion profile in which at least one agent adheres to the inconsistent theory, starting out from an opinion profile without any such agent (and assuming a uniform prior over these anonymous profiles). We found this probability to be zero for M = 1. This finding is confirmed in the current study. Nevertheless, by studying the dynamical space in general, we have observed certain trends that help to explain the previously obtained results for the probability of consistent-to-inconsistent updating.

For M = 2, the probability that an agent will arrive at the inconsistent theory, in a population where none have adopted this theory, is non-zero (provided that D > 0 and N > 2). In our previous work, we observed that this probability decreases when more independent issues are considered (that is, when M increases beyond 2). We are now in a better position to explain the𠅎ssentially combinatorial—mechanism behind this finding. Although we have not presented cross-sections for the higher-dimensional case, we can give a qualitative discussion of cases with M > 1. As M increases, the belief space becomes higher-dimensional (tM − 1) and the basin that is attracted by the sink corresponding to consensus on the inconsistency becomes a smaller fraction of its total (hyper-)volume (equal to 1/tM for D = wM). This corresponds to the observation in our previous study that the probability of updating to the inconsistent theory is lowered by forming theories over more independent issues (higher M). For a larger number of agents (higher N), the dimensions of the belief space remain the same, but the opinion profile has access to more points of this space. As a result, the probability of consensus on the inconsistent theory is lower, too this is in line with the earlier findings as well.

For belief spaces with a fixed number of agents (with M = 1 and D > 0), we observed that if the number of agents is even, the midpoint of the edges is accessible and acts as a source (in respect to other points on the edge). This is confirmed by our study of the ODS: the midpoint of an edge belongs to a line separating two or three basins. In the ODS, it also becomes clear that the midpoint on a “single” edge acts as a sink for points from the line between this midpoint and the midpoint of a 𠇍ouble” edge (half of the line for D = 1, all of it for D = 2). Moreover, if the number of agents is a multiple of four, the midpoint of the entire tetrahedron is accessible and acts as a source. In contrast, if the number of agents is a multiple of three, the midpoint of each of the faces is accessible and acts as a source (for D = 1). So, in the case of an even number of agents, there are more fixed points than in the case of an odd number of agents. Taken together, these effects explain the 𠇎ven–odd wobble” in our previous study: the observation that agents have a lower probability of updating to the inconsistent theory in an even-numbered population than in an odd-numbered population of similar size.

Moreover, for fixed M, there is a limited number of these special points, whereas the total number of accessible points in the belief space rises fast when the number of agents, N, increases. Consequently, the number of these special points as compared to the total number of opinion profiles in the hyper-volume decreases when N increases, which explains the attenuation of the wobble for larger populations. If we consider (a face of) the ODS for M = 1 and D > 0 (cf. Figure 6), we see that the majority of opinion densities belong to some basin that is attracted to a sink. However, most of the points that are accessible in the OPS for a relatively small population size do not belong to these basins. Hence, small populations have a relatively high probability of producing delicately balanced opinion profiles, which tend to act as unstable equilibria (sources) and do not lead to full consensus.

Additionally, as the number M of propositions increases, the dimensionality of the belief space increases, as does the absolute number of these special points, but their number as compared to the possible points in the hyper-volume decreases. This explains the earlier observed decrease in the maximal probability of updating to the inconsistent theory as M increases.

While the model studied in this paper is idealized in several respects, it is not completely unrealistic. Even if real agents do not generally compromise with their peers exactly in the way our artificial agents do, real agents do tend to influence each other's belief states, whether consciously or not. Idealized models can give information about such processes, much in the way in which the Ideal Gas Law gives information about the behavior of real gases. Also, there are several ways to make the model more realistic, for instance, as indicated earlier, by providing the agents with direct evidence about the truth, which in our model could be added as a driving force, directed toward a particular theory, or𠅎quivalently𠅊s an external potential directed toward one of the vertices of the ODS, corresponding to consensus on a theory with exactly one non-zero bit.

But even in its present, idealized form, the model we have studied demonstrates that there may be issues of rationality specifically arising from the way or ways we interact epistemically with fellow inquirers. We will be content if this sways some traditional (“individualistic”) epistemologists as well as some psychologists to take the social level into consideration in their studies of rationality. For the latter group, we note that already the current model suggests a number of seemingly worthwhile empirical studies, focusing on how real people influence one another's belief states, on which factors determine whether people regard someone as their peer (in the technical sense used here), and on whether whatever epistemic interactions take place in reality tend to aid the achievement of people's epistemic goals.


Conclusion

Heroes loom large as exemplars of morality. They often embody virtues that we wish to express in our lives. Our findings suggest that heroic images𠄾ven relatively subtle images of superheroes–may increase one’s intentions to help and actual helping behavior. As superheroes become an increasing large and accessible part of the symbolic cultural narrative, their role in inspiring virtuous and meaningful lives may become more robust. As this occurs, we may, as Mark Twain wrote, continue our fascination with, and perhaps even worship of, heroes.


Most Read

Lowrie has similar ambitions. "Our guidance shows us buying two more clubs this year and five more clubs next year because with our stock price, we can raise money and we have a pipeline full of potential acquisitions."

There are about 3,600 strip clubs nationwide, Lowrie said. "And from a business point of view, it's all like Las Vegas was in the early '70s. Investors and banks are realizing that like gambling and casinos, adult entertainment and gentlemen's clubs are a legitimate business."

"There's nothing we don't take into account," Langan said. "Club location, nearest competition, the legal environment in a city and zoning laws when we invest.

"Ultimately though," he added, "you want to get into a market and dominate, just like any other business."


3 Mark Questions

1. A particle of mass m and charge q is released form rest in a uniform electric field of intensity E. calculate the kinetic energy it attains after moving a distances between the plates?
Ans. Since F = qE
—1
Using third equation of motion

Initially charged particle is at rest u = o


Substituting 1 in eq. 2


2. Two point charges +q and +9q are separated by a distance of 10 a. Find the point on the line joining the two changes where electric field is zero?
Ans. Let P be the pt where test charge (+qo) is present then electric field at pt. P will be zero if Field at pt. P due to +q = field at p+. P due to + 9q————1

Substituting in eq. 1



a from change (+q)
Or
a from change (+9q)

3. Define the term dipole moment of an electric dipole indicating its direction. Write its S.I unit. An electric dipole is placed in a uniform electric field. Deduce the expression for the Torque acting on it.
Ans. Electric dipole moment is defined as the product of the magnitude of either charge and the length of dipole. Its direction is from –ve to +ve charge.
Its S.I. unit is coulomb meter (Cm)

Consider a dipole placed in uniform electric field and makes an angle () with the electric field Since two forces acts on the charges constituting an electric dipole which are equal and opposite in direction, thus a torque acts on the dipole which makes the dipole rotate.
And Torque
Here force (F) = qE


() = PE Sin

In vector form

4. A sphere of radius encloses a change Q. If there is another concentric sphere of radius and there is no additional change between. Find the ratio of electric flux through?
Ans. = q/o (where =electric flux)




5. Electric charge is uniformly distributed on the surface of a spherical balloon. Show how electric intensity and electric potential vary (a) on the surface (b) inside and (c) outside.

Ans. Electric field intensity on the surface of a shell
E = /o& V = Kq/R
Inside E = o& V = Kq/R
Outside E = & V = Kq/r

6. Two point electric charges of value q and 2q are kept at a distance d apart from each other in air. A third charge Q is to be kept along the same line in such a way that the net force acting on q and 2q is zero. Calculate the position of charge Q in terms of q and d.

Ans. Net force on charge q and 2q will be zero if the third charge is negative (i.e. of opposite sign) and q and 2q are positive, Force on change q will be zero if







comparing equation 1 and 2





7. What is the force between two small charged spheres having charges of and placed 30 cm apart in air?
Ans.Repulsive force of magnitude
Charge on the first sphere, =
Charge on the second sphere,
Distance between the spheres, r = 30 cm = 0.3 m
Electrostatic force between the spheres is given by the relation,

Where, = Permittivity of free space
s

Hence, force between the two small charged spheres is. The charges are of same nature. Hence, force between them will be repulsive.

8. The electrostatic force on a small sphere of charge due to another small sphere of charge – in air is (a) What is the distance between the two spheres? (b) What is the force on the second sphere due to the first?
Ans. (a) Electrostatic force on the first sphere, F =
Charge on this sphere, =
Charge on the second sphere, = –
Electrostatic force between the spheres is given by the relation,

Where, = Permittivity of free space




The distance between the two spheres is 0.12m.
(b) Both the spheres attract each other with the same force. Therefore, the force on the second sphere due to the first is 0.2N.

9. A polythene piece rubbed with wool is found to have a negative charge of
(a) Estimate the number of electrons transferred (from which to which?)
(b) Is there a transfer of mass from wool to polythene?
Ans. (a) When polythene is rubbed against wool, a number of electrons get transferred from wool to polythene. Hence, wool becomes positively charged and polythene becomes negatively charged.
Amount of charge on the polythene piece,
Amount of charge on an electron,
Number of electrons transferred from wool to polythene = n
n can be calculated using the relation,




Therefore, the number of electrons transferred from wool to polythene is.
(b) Yes.
There is a transfer of mass taking place. This is because an electron has mass,

Total mass transferred to polythene from wool,



Hence, a negligible amount of mass is transferred from wool to polythene.

10.Consider a uniform electric field . (a) What is the flux of this field through a square of 10 cm on a side whose plane is parallel to the yz plane? (b) What is the flux through the same square if the normal to its plane makes a angle with the x-axis?
Ans. (a) Electric field intensity,
Magnitude of electric field intensity,
Side of the square, s = 10 cm = 0.1 m
Area of the square,
The plane of the square is parallel to the y-z plane. Hence, angle between the unit vector normal to the plane and electric field,
Flux ( through the plane is given by the relation,
=


(b) Plane makes an angle of 60° with the x-axis. Hence, θ = 60°
Flux, =


11. A point charge +10 is a distance 5 cm directly above the centre of a square of side 10 cm, as shown in Fig. 1.34. What is the magnitude of the electric flux through the square? (Hint: Think of the square as one face of a cube with edge 10 cm.)
Ans. The square can be considered as one face of a cube of edge 10 cm with a centre where charge q is placed. According to Gauss’s theorem for a cube, total electric flux is through all its six faces.


Hence, electric flux through one face of the cube i.e., through the square,

Where,
∈0 = Permittivity of free space

q = 10


=
Therefore, electric flux through the square is 1

12. A point charge of 2.0 is at the centre of a cubic Gaussian surface 9.0 cm on edge. What is the net electric flux through the surface?
Ans. Net electric flux (ΦNet) through the cubic surface is given by,
ϕ N e t = q ϵ 0 ϕNet=qϵ0
Where, ∈0 = Permittivity of free space
= 8.854 × 10 −12 N −1 C 2 m −2
q = Net charge contained inside the cube = 2.0 μC = 2 × 10 −6 C
∴ ϕ N e t = 2 × 10 − 6 8.854 × 10 − 12 ϕNet=2×10−68.854×10−12
= 2.26 × 10 5 N m 2 C −1
The net electric flux through the surface is 2.26 ×10 5 N m 2 C −1 .

13. A point charge causes an electric flux of – to pass through a spherical Gaussian surface of 10.0 cm radius centered on the charge. (a) If the radius of the Gaussian surface were doubled, how much flux would pass through the surface? (b) What is the value of the point charge?
Ans. (a) Electric flux
Radius of the Gaussian surface,
r = 10.0 cm
Electric flux piercing out through a surface depends on the net charge enclosed inside a body. It does not depend on the size of the body. If the radius of the Gaussian surface is doubled, then the flux passing through the surface remains the same i.e
(b) Electric flux is given by the relation,

Where,
q = Net charge enclosed by the spherical surface
= Permittivity of free space =



= – 8.854 nC
Therefore, the value of the point charge is –8.854 nC.

14. A conducting sphere of radius 10 cm has an unknown charge. If the electric field 20 cm from the centre of the sphere is and points radially inward, what is the net charge on the sphere?
Ans. Electric field intensity (E) at a distance (d) from the centre of a sphere containing net charge q is given by the relation,

Where,
q = Net charge =
d = Distance from the centre = 20 cm = 0.2 m
= Permittivity of free space
And, = 9 × 109 N C – 2


= 6.67 nC
Therefore, the net charge on the sphere is 6.67 nC.

15. A uniformly charged conducting sphere of 2.4 m diameter has a surface charge density of 80.0 /m 2 . (a) Find the charge on the sphere. (b) What is the total electric flux leaving the surface of the sphere?
Ans. (a) Diameter of the sphere, d = 2.4 m
Radius of the sphere, r = 1.2 m
Surface charge density, = 80.0
Total charge on the surface of the sphere,
Q = Charge density × Surface area
=

Therefore, the charge on the sphere is
(b) Total electric flux () leaving out the surface of a sphere containing net charge Q is given by the relation,

Where,
= Permittivity of free space




Therefore, the total electric flux leaving the surface of the sphere is

16. An infinite line charge produces a field of at a distance of 2 cm. Calculate the linear charge density.
Ans. Electric field produced by the infinite line charges at a distance d having linear charge density is given by the relation,


Where,
d = 2 cm = 0.02 m
E
= Permittivity of free space
=


Therefore, the linear charge density is .
17. Which among the curves shown in Fig. 1.35 cannot possibly represent electrostatic field lines?
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Ans. (a) The field lines showed in (a) do not represent electrostatic field lines because field lines must be normal to the surface of the conductor.
(b) The field lines showed in (b) do not represent electrostatic field lines because the field lines cannot emerge from a negative charge and cannot terminate at a positive charge.
(c) The field lines showed in (c) represent electrostatic field lines. This is because the field lines emerge from the positive charges and repel each other.
(d) The field lines showed in (d) do not represent electrostatic field lines because the field lines should not intersect each other.
(e) The field lines showed in (e) do not represent electrostatic field lines because closed loops are not formed in the area between the field lines.
18. Suppose that the particle in Exercise in 1.33 is an electron projected with velocity . If E between the plates separated by 0.5 cm is , where will the electron strike the upper plate? (| e | = .)
Ans. Velocity of the particle,
Separation of the two plates, d = 0.5 cm = 0.005 m
Electric field between the two plates, E
Charge on an electron, q =
Mass of an electron, me =
Let the electron strike the upper plate at the end of plate L, when deflection is s.
Therefore,






Therefore, the electron will strike the upper plate after travelling 1.6 cm.


Elements of Murdoch’s moral psychology

When Murdoch discusses moral psychology, the expression she sometimes uses is that of a picture of the soul. She took herself to be laying out a picture of the soul different from that of her contemporaries. I shall list some important elements in her moral psychology. They are interdependent, and I have not tried to list them in an order which reflects their significance.

1.

Thinking which is part of our moral life goes on a very great deal of the time. (In her later work, Murdoch held that all consciousness is morally coloured.) It is not limited to the considering of “situations” taken to present a person with some moral choice or moral demand, and of principles capable of enabling us to respond to such “situations.” The idea of a “moral agent” as someone who is occasionally confronted by some situation that she can recognise to be a “moral situation” or one demanding a moral choice is repudiated by Murdoch. What is involved in moral life and thought is not tied by Murdoch to a conception of moral agency of a kind which would make observable action and choice central to moral psychology in the way they are for most moral philosophers.

2.

Thinking can be part of moral life without being tied in any direct way to observable action and choice. It may be directed toward getting a true and just understanding of something. Murdoch’s most famous example is meant to illustrate this point: the example of the mother-in-law, M, who comes to see her daughter-in-law, D, more justly. This is a moral achievement even if D is dead, and there is no question how M will go on to treat her, and even if M’s behaviour toward the girl has always been exemplary.

While this example is meant to illustrate how we can come to a just view, Murdoch’s discussion makes plain that a slightly changed version of the same example could illustrate someone deluding herself, trying to save herself from recognition of how unfortunate her son has been in his marriage. If thinking that gives us a truer view of reality is a moral achievement, thinking that takes us further into fantasy is a moral failure.

3.

Imaginative elements are important in moral life in many and various kinds of way. A person’s moral life might, for example, be penetrated by the idea that she has a special destiny, or that she is under a kind of curse such fables may enter the person’s practical life or in other cases might be mere decoration. Another kind of way in which imagination enters moral life is in the role which may be given to some individual as a source of moral inspiration.

Imagination is involved in the conceptual activities which shape our understanding of the world and life. Take the example she gives in “Vision and Choice in Morality” of people who “emphasise the inexhaustible detail of the world, the endlessness of the task of understanding,” which illustrates how imagination is involved in the shaping of a fundamental moral attitude. The inexhaustibility of the detail of the world is not, as it were, there to be established by some argument, but is part of an imaginative vision of the world. Any far-reaching moral or moral-religious concept is grasped imaginatively, and not all at once such concepts are then capable of “stirring” our practical thinking at deep levels. (Though we should note that what can be meant by the term “concept” is one of the debatable matters here. A fundamental mode of understanding of the world or life is exactly the sort of thing Murdoch treats as a central case of a moral concept, but it wouldn’t be a concept at all on many views.)

4.

Moral life is not primarily a matter of choices. The more one has been attentive to reality, the less one will find oneself aware of having to make a choice. Frequently it will simply be clear what needs to be done, and one no more thinks of there being a choice than one takes oneself to be making choices as one drives along a road with numerous roads branching off which do not go where one is heading. This way of thinking does not involve a denial of freedom, but places freedom at a different point, not at the point of choosing.

5.

The determinants of action are far more complex than they are taken to be by most contemporary moral philosophers. There is no single pattern which is the pattern of voluntary action, or of characteristically human action, or of moral action rather, the determinants of action, the things that actually motivate, emerge from various levels (conscious or relatively submerged) of thought, feeling, memory.

Here is how an example can be drawn from Murdoch: she writes of how we evade the idea of death, and how tragedy “must contain some dreadful vision of the reality and significance of death.” An imaginative facing, at some time, of death, a refusal of evasion, can then enter what we think and how we act at some later time in our lives, perhaps in our not being tempted by some fantasy, or in resistance to the seduction of power. Such an idea of how imaginative activity at one time can shape moral life at a later time is essential to Murdoch’s moral psychology. But again, one should note that a similar process can work in the morally opposite direction, when the willingness to go along with a cheap or evasive or corrupt understanding of something shapes how we think and act later.

Also important in Murdoch’s ideas about the determinants of action is desire, understood to be properly subjected to a kind of “training” through moral life ― that is, through our coming to see reality clearly and justly. This kind of modification of desire is a gradual business. Murdoch doesn’t deny possible clashes of duty and inclination, but that sort of episode, because it is highly visible and easily portrayed in fiction, may distract attention from what she plainly takes to be the more important kind of case, in which the whole structure of desire in a person may gradually shift so that good action occurs without any felt conflict or without even the sense of a choice having to be made.

Murdoch emphasises how the attempt to reach understanding of something, to see clearly something outside the self, can shape a person’s pattern of desire and thus make available sources of energy that can motivate actions. The “training” of desire, as Murdoch understands it, comes about in part through our use of moral concepts ― such as that of envy, or malice, or generosity.

There is an important connection here with her ideas about imagination: for concepts illuminate and shape our moral world. If good actions can be attractive, it is in part through the imaginative power of the concepts we can deploy in thinking and seeing the reality in which we need to act. The world in which we act is not motivationally inert but is rather characterised by magnetic fields, as it were, in which actions can be attractive to us, through the kind of place they have in the world as shaped already by perception and by fantasy or imagination ― that is, in ways which have already involved activity on our part.

It is no part of Murdoch’s view of the determinants of action to deny the existence of the kinds of case that tend to be prominently in view in most moral philosophy, of actions done for public reasons. It is rather that she regards such cases as simply among the kinds of case there can be, and insists on the great variety of possible kinds of case. (The methodology here is Wittgensteinian: there is nothing the matter with the way philosophers have described a type of case their mistake is to have taken a particular kind of case and to have supposed that, in describing it, they were describing the entire field rather than one part of it.)

5a.

Murdoch’s conception of the determinants of action involves dropping the familiar imagery that accompanies much philosophical thinking about “the will”: the image of a setting of something into motion, an image which then carries along with it the need to ask questions about whether reason can provide the impetus, or only desire or what. One of the alternative images used by Murdoch is that of a person’s moral being as a “fabric” which shows itself in the person’s overt actions, but also in her thoughts, jokes, patterns of attention, fantasies, imaginative explorations and a thousand other things.

The imagery of “the will” fits closely with the idea that one could, at least in principle, sort what goes on in the soul into active bits and passive bits, things we genuinely do and things which are properly happenings to us rather than doings and then the active bits can themselves be sorted into those belonging to practical life and those belonging on the theoretical side. The alternative image of the fabric of being suggests that active and passive are mixed together in far more complex ways than would allow our desire for a relatively tidy theory to be satisfied.

The picture of “the will” lays stress on certain particular sorts of case of determination of action (though the sorts of case which are stressed depend on the particular theory), and can be misleading by occluding other sorts of case, by encouraging us to stop reflection just where it should continue, and by creating the appearance of problems about the determination of the will ― problems that depend on the idea of there being some very small number of basic patterns, rather than an indefinitely large number of ways, many of them “obscure and complicated,” in which we come to act.

The idea of the will in philosophy, as belonging to the theory of action, leads us to ignore the kind of activity and effort which may be involved in forming beliefs about people: one may recognise that one finds it hard to trust someone, for example, and that one needs to try to do so one might try to free oneself from some habitually used picture.

6.

One of the two central concepts in Murdoch’s rethinking of moral psychology is attention. As she writes in “The Idea of Perfection”: “I can only choose within the world I can see, in the moral sense of ‘see’ which implies that clear vision is a result of moral imagination and moral effort.” The notion of attention is crucial in Murdoch’s repudiation of the whole idea of a separation between the theoretical realm and the practical. Her difference from mainstream moral philosophy over the separation between theoretical and practical thinking shapes her conception of moral psychology. The denial that moral thought is concerned centrally with situations that confront one with a moral choice is tied to her idea that what moral life demands is not primarily getting choices right, but achieving in a piecemeal way a clarity of vision in the ideal sort of case, such a perception of reality would lead to appropriate action.

7.

The other central concept in the rethinking of moral psychology is love. Like the concept of attention, it is important in the repudiation of a divide between the theoretical and practical realms: the concept of knowledge, relevant to moral life, is of knowledge available through loving attention ― knowledge which is responsive to the reality of things outside of one’s self. Although there are passages where Murdoch simply identifies love with perception of the reality of what lies outside the self, she elsewhere recognises the variety of forms love takes, which include forms of love that feed off fantasy.

8.

Moral differences between people go much deeper than simply the application of moral concepts in different ways to the same world. The conceptual activities of the mind and the spirit in which we see the world make us who we are, morally speaking two people may not, in the relevant sense, inhabit the same world.

9.

Murdoch’s understanding of reason was partly shaped by her contemporaries, and in particular by Stuart Hampshire, whose views she reacted against. She took his account of the relation between reason and will to be extremely widespread, and she rejects his account of rationality as concerned with taking in the intersubjectively available facts ― an activity which supposedly then leaves room for will to operate. Arguing against this view, but making a limited kind of use of the notion of will in her argument, Murdoch insists that will is not separable from reason (here taken to be the faculty through which we form beliefs), since an activity of the will is involved in our coming to see reality and will can influence belief for the worse as well.

She doesn’t discuss any conception of the will as practical reason in a Kantian sense. There is, however, a conception of reason of a different sort in her treatment of Plato, for example in the idea that mathematics is “good for the soul,” in making for an attachment to truth, a capacity to focus on what is real, what is outside the self.

10.

Murdoch allows for the significance of moral rules, of a sphere of obligation and of a sense of duty in moral upbringing and in the moral life of adults, but has relatively little interest in the details of how rules are brought into contact with choice, or the role which rules may have in practical reasoning. She does not see the context of choice as needing to be illuminated by a theoretical regimentation, so that some structure of reasoning could in principle be discerned, at least implicitly, in any choice. She explicitly rejects any conception of the application of rules which would see them as brought into contact with “the facts,” conceived to be available in some morally neutral way. The character which a rule has in a person’s moral life depends on how it connects with his understanding of life, including social life: a rule may be a mere remnant of past training, or instead integrated with his knowledge, his capacity to see and respond to reality.

11.

Murdoch gives an important place to freedom while rejecting a dualism of active and passive elements in our psychology. Although there is no dualism, a contrast important for her picture of the soul is that between egoistic thinking, which has a kind of mechanical or closed-in-on-itself character, and the activity of attempting to reach truth, which is particularly hard to describe, because it is essentially various in the forms it takes: the working over of thoughts, perceptions, images, attachments, feelings. Its openness, and its being the site of freedom, are inseparable from the variety of the ways in which we can come to see or understand things better.

Murdoch pointed out what she took to be misleading or positively wrong in the ideas about freedom which analytic and continental philosophers had put forward. She repeatedly criticised conceptions of freedom that tie it to the moment of action she saw such conceptions as dependent on the idea of the “hard” world of facts, thought of as forming the background to an exercise of the will.

Murdoch’s own alternative conception of freedom ties it closely to the capacity for attention ― a capacity which may be exercised in a great variety of ways, in all sorts of circumstances, not specially when we need to decide what to do. This notion of freedom thus also ties it closely to knowledge, achievable through efforts of attention, attempts to counteract dishonest thinking, and to be more patient and just in thought and perception. Murdoch’s understanding of freedom ties it also to the idea that there is freedom “to see the world differently,” to work with fundamentally different conceptualisations of things.

12.

Virtue, too, is tied closely to knowledge and to attention to what lies outside the ego. Murdoch emphasises the importance of there being a variety of virtues, but also sees them as having an underlying unity which may nevertheless be difficult to discern. She connects the virtues with the idea of a person’s “fabric of being,” the image suggesting something which is continuous, into which various strands are woven, something which has various patterns in it. The image also allows for the pattern of courage in one person’s fabric to be quite distinct from the pattern of courage in someone else’s fabric. The characteristics of the fabric are present as much in habits of thought and feeling as in overt action.

13.

Murdoch criticised the ideas of her contemporaries about concepts in general and about moral concepts in particular. She did not see having a concept as basically a matter of being able to recognise and discriminate a pattern in things. The prevalent idea when she began writing about philosophy was that a concept was a way of using a word. This was useful as far as it went, she thought, but it left out quite different sorts of case, of great philosophical interest.

What Murdoch emphasises is our capacity to develop through language and especially through the use of metaphor and “semi-sensible” pictures some way of making sense of things. Modes of recognition and discrimination of things are included, but the range of cases she considers is much wider, and the recognition/discrimination cases fall into place only as relatively subsidiary kinds of case. The important moral concepts, like truth, will have great internal complexity, and this kind of complexity is important in her ideas about fundamental differences of moral vision.

Differences of moral vision and differences of concept are closely tied. The range of what she would consider a moral concept is much greater than what most philosophers would consider a moral concept: thus, for example, the twentieth-century idea of a “factual disagreement” would count for her as a moral concept, one that plays a role in a moral vision of the nature and situation of human beings. So too the idea of the separability of fact and value. The work done by a concept, on her view, is quite different from what it would be in many accounts. The concept of love, for instance, may be an organising concept in someone’s life, and thus is not primarily to be understood as a way of picking out what would be a case of love, or a case of acting lovingly, and what would not.

Murdoch’s understanding of the role of the concept certainly includes its use in (for example) thinking about whether what one feels, what someone else feels, is indeed love, but the role of the concept in her ethics goes much further than that. It is an essential element in a moral vision, and makes it possible to bring together in complex ways ideas about knowledge, attention, perception, freedom and action.

Murdoch’s idea of organising concepts or conceptual configurations, which structure someone’s understanding, is at the heart of her rejection of the usual ideas about the distinction between fact and value. The “fact-value” picture of the world is tied to an idea of moral concepts as applying to things or situations by supervening on the non-moral facts. That picture is expressive of a conceptual configuration, a “type of moral attitude” it is a sort of conceptual configuration that works to keep from view its own role in our thought.


3 Mark Questions

1. A particle of mass m and charge q is released form rest in a uniform electric field of intensity E. calculate the kinetic energy it attains after moving a distances between the plates?
Ans. Since F = qE
—1
Using third equation of motion

Initially charged particle is at rest u = o


Substituting 1 in eq. 2


2. Two point charges +q and +9q are separated by a distance of 10 a. Find the point on the line joining the two changes where electric field is zero?
Ans. Let P be the pt where test charge (+qo) is present then electric field at pt. P will be zero if Field at pt. P due to +q = field at p+. P due to + 9q————1

Substituting in eq. 1



a from change (+q)
Or
a from change (+9q)

3. Define the term dipole moment of an electric dipole indicating its direction. Write its S.I unit. An electric dipole is placed in a uniform electric field. Deduce the expression for the Torque acting on it.
Ans. Electric dipole moment is defined as the product of the magnitude of either charge and the length of dipole. Its direction is from –ve to +ve charge.
Its S.I. unit is coulomb meter (Cm)

Consider a dipole placed in uniform electric field and makes an angle () with the electric field Since two forces acts on the charges constituting an electric dipole which are equal and opposite in direction, thus a torque acts on the dipole which makes the dipole rotate.
And Torque
Here force (F) = qE


() = PE Sin

In vector form

4. A sphere of radius encloses a change Q. If there is another concentric sphere of radius and there is no additional change between. Find the ratio of electric flux through?
Ans. = q/o (where =electric flux)




5. Electric charge is uniformly distributed on the surface of a spherical balloon. Show how electric intensity and electric potential vary (a) on the surface (b) inside and (c) outside.

Ans. Electric field intensity on the surface of a shell
E = /o& V = Kq/R
Inside E = o& V = Kq/R
Outside E = & V = Kq/r

6. Two point electric charges of value q and 2q are kept at a distance d apart from each other in air. A third charge Q is to be kept along the same line in such a way that the net force acting on q and 2q is zero. Calculate the position of charge Q in terms of q and d.

Ans. Net force on charge q and 2q will be zero if the third charge is negative (i.e. of opposite sign) and q and 2q are positive, Force on change q will be zero if







comparing equation 1 and 2





7. What is the force between two small charged spheres having charges of and placed 30 cm apart in air?
Ans.Repulsive force of magnitude
Charge on the first sphere, =
Charge on the second sphere,
Distance between the spheres, r = 30 cm = 0.3 m
Electrostatic force between the spheres is given by the relation,

Where, = Permittivity of free space
s

Hence, force between the two small charged spheres is. The charges are of same nature. Hence, force between them will be repulsive.

8. The electrostatic force on a small sphere of charge due to another small sphere of charge – in air is (a) What is the distance between the two spheres? (b) What is the force on the second sphere due to the first?
Ans. (a) Electrostatic force on the first sphere, F =
Charge on this sphere, =
Charge on the second sphere, = –
Electrostatic force between the spheres is given by the relation,

Where, = Permittivity of free space




The distance between the two spheres is 0.12m.
(b) Both the spheres attract each other with the same force. Therefore, the force on the second sphere due to the first is 0.2N.

9. A polythene piece rubbed with wool is found to have a negative charge of
(a) Estimate the number of electrons transferred (from which to which?)
(b) Is there a transfer of mass from wool to polythene?
Ans. (a) When polythene is rubbed against wool, a number of electrons get transferred from wool to polythene. Hence, wool becomes positively charged and polythene becomes negatively charged.
Amount of charge on the polythene piece,
Amount of charge on an electron,
Number of electrons transferred from wool to polythene = n
n can be calculated using the relation,




Therefore, the number of electrons transferred from wool to polythene is.
(b) Yes.
There is a transfer of mass taking place. This is because an electron has mass,

Total mass transferred to polythene from wool,



Hence, a negligible amount of mass is transferred from wool to polythene.

10.Consider a uniform electric field . (a) What is the flux of this field through a square of 10 cm on a side whose plane is parallel to the yz plane? (b) What is the flux through the same square if the normal to its plane makes a angle with the x-axis?
Ans. (a) Electric field intensity,
Magnitude of electric field intensity,
Side of the square, s = 10 cm = 0.1 m
Area of the square,
The plane of the square is parallel to the y-z plane. Hence, angle between the unit vector normal to the plane and electric field,
Flux ( through the plane is given by the relation,
=


(b) Plane makes an angle of 60° with the x-axis. Hence, θ = 60°
Flux, =


11. A point charge +10 is a distance 5 cm directly above the centre of a square of side 10 cm, as shown in Fig. 1.34. What is the magnitude of the electric flux through the square? (Hint: Think of the square as one face of a cube with edge 10 cm.)
Ans. The square can be considered as one face of a cube of edge 10 cm with a centre where charge q is placed. According to Gauss’s theorem for a cube, total electric flux is through all its six faces.


Hence, electric flux through one face of the cube i.e., through the square,

Where,
∈0 = Permittivity of free space

q = 10


=
Therefore, electric flux through the square is 1

12. A point charge of 2.0 is at the centre of a cubic Gaussian surface 9.0 cm on edge. What is the net electric flux through the surface?
Ans. Net electric flux (ΦNet) through the cubic surface is given by,
ϕ N e t = q ϵ 0 ϕNet=qϵ0
Where, ∈0 = Permittivity of free space
= 8.854 × 10 −12 N −1 C 2 m −2
q = Net charge contained inside the cube = 2.0 μC = 2 × 10 −6 C
∴ ϕ N e t = 2 × 10 − 6 8.854 × 10 − 12 ϕNet=2×10−68.854×10−12
= 2.26 × 10 5 N m 2 C −1
The net electric flux through the surface is 2.26 ×10 5 N m 2 C −1 .

13. A point charge causes an electric flux of – to pass through a spherical Gaussian surface of 10.0 cm radius centered on the charge. (a) If the radius of the Gaussian surface were doubled, how much flux would pass through the surface? (b) What is the value of the point charge?
Ans. (a) Electric flux
Radius of the Gaussian surface,
r = 10.0 cm
Electric flux piercing out through a surface depends on the net charge enclosed inside a body. It does not depend on the size of the body. If the radius of the Gaussian surface is doubled, then the flux passing through the surface remains the same i.e
(b) Electric flux is given by the relation,

Where,
q = Net charge enclosed by the spherical surface
= Permittivity of free space =



= – 8.854 nC
Therefore, the value of the point charge is –8.854 nC.

14. A conducting sphere of radius 10 cm has an unknown charge. If the electric field 20 cm from the centre of the sphere is and points radially inward, what is the net charge on the sphere?
Ans. Electric field intensity (E) at a distance (d) from the centre of a sphere containing net charge q is given by the relation,

Where,
q = Net charge =
d = Distance from the centre = 20 cm = 0.2 m
= Permittivity of free space
And, = 9 × 109 N C – 2


= 6.67 nC
Therefore, the net charge on the sphere is 6.67 nC.

15. A uniformly charged conducting sphere of 2.4 m diameter has a surface charge density of 80.0 /m 2 . (a) Find the charge on the sphere. (b) What is the total electric flux leaving the surface of the sphere?
Ans. (a) Diameter of the sphere, d = 2.4 m
Radius of the sphere, r = 1.2 m
Surface charge density, = 80.0
Total charge on the surface of the sphere,
Q = Charge density × Surface area
=

Therefore, the charge on the sphere is
(b) Total electric flux () leaving out the surface of a sphere containing net charge Q is given by the relation,

Where,
= Permittivity of free space




Therefore, the total electric flux leaving the surface of the sphere is

16. An infinite line charge produces a field of at a distance of 2 cm. Calculate the linear charge density.
Ans. Electric field produced by the infinite line charges at a distance d having linear charge density is given by the relation,


Where,
d = 2 cm = 0.02 m
E
= Permittivity of free space
=


Therefore, the linear charge density is .
17. Which among the curves shown in Fig. 1.35 cannot possibly represent electrostatic field lines?
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Ans. (a) The field lines showed in (a) do not represent electrostatic field lines because field lines must be normal to the surface of the conductor.
(b) The field lines showed in (b) do not represent electrostatic field lines because the field lines cannot emerge from a negative charge and cannot terminate at a positive charge.
(c) The field lines showed in (c) represent electrostatic field lines. This is because the field lines emerge from the positive charges and repel each other.
(d) The field lines showed in (d) do not represent electrostatic field lines because the field lines should not intersect each other.
(e) The field lines showed in (e) do not represent electrostatic field lines because closed loops are not formed in the area between the field lines.
18. Suppose that the particle in Exercise in 1.33 is an electron projected with velocity . If E between the plates separated by 0.5 cm is , where will the electron strike the upper plate? (| e | = .)
Ans. Velocity of the particle,
Separation of the two plates, d = 0.5 cm = 0.005 m
Electric field between the two plates, E
Charge on an electron, q =
Mass of an electron, me =
Let the electron strike the upper plate at the end of plate L, when deflection is s.
Therefore,






Therefore, the electron will strike the upper plate after travelling 1.6 cm.


6. General Discussion

Due to social updating, an agent who starts out with a consistent theory about the world may arrive at the inconsistent theory. Even if maintaining consistency at all times is too demanding for non-ideal beings to qualify as a necessary condition for rationality (Cherniak, 1986), it is presumably something that rational beings should aim for. This may suggest that social updating is a vice, from the perspective of rationality. However, in our first study (Wenmackers et al., 2012) we computed the probability for an agent to update to the inconsistent theory and found it to be non-zero, but relatively small (lower than 2%) moreover, it can be made arbitrarily low by strategically varying the model parameters.

Our current study of the opinion dynamics on the belief space reveals another virtue of the social updating process: even if an agent starts out at the inconsistent theory, the agent's opinion may change—to one of the consistent theories𠅍ue to the social update rule. This could already be seen on the basis of Example 3.2, but the results depicted in Figure 6 give more systematic information in this respect: except for the rightmost edge and its two vertices, all the opinion profiles in the presented face of the tetrahedron contain at least one agent who starts out at the inconsistent theory. Nevertheless, when there is any dynamics at all, many of these opinion profiles evolve to different profiles, some of which have no agents at the inconsistent theory. This is true, in particular, for all the opinion profiles in the blue and green areas, which act as basins for consensus positions on consistent theories.

We have given a probabilistic interpretation of the results on the belief space (OPS and ODS). We have seen that in the limit for an infinite population size and for large BCIs (D = wM), the relative importance of unstable equilibria vanishes. For M = 1 and D = 2, the probability of arriving at a population-wide consensus on some theory is unity. In particular, the probability of arriving at a population-wide consensus on the inconsistent theory is 1/4. Once the agents reach consensus on the inconsistent theory, there will be no further dynamics, because all consensus positions are fixed points. Hence, this result may be regarded as a worst case. However, this case study is highly unrealistic for (at least) three reasons.

First, the assumption of a uniform prior on the opinion profiles does not apply to real cases. Observe that if the agents were to pick out their initial theory at random, the distribution of initial anonymous opinion profiles would be higher around the center of the belief space. (For larger populations, there are more combinations of individual theories that lead to an anonymous opinion profile, in which all theories are represented almost evenly.) More importantly, however, we do not expect the agents to adopt an initial theory at random but rather to possess some prior knowledge, such that the distribution of their initial theories is clustered around the true theory (which is necessarily a consistent one). Hence we also expect a preferential position of the opinion profiles in a region around consensus on the true theory. For this reason, investigation of a more complex model, based on a variant of our current update rule (EHK), but including evidence-gathering as well as social updating, is high on our to-do list.

Second, in many practical situations relevant population sizes tend to be small (just think of the last meeting you attended), such that the infinite population limit does not apply well to them. In smaller populations, the relative importance of unstable equilibria (which do not lead to consensus) is more pronounced.

Third, modeling belief states as theories of the world only has practical relevance when M > 1, for which the relative size of the basins associated with consensus positions decreases rapidly (as 1/tM).

For all these reasons, we estimate the probability of arriving at a consensus on the inconsistent theory to be very small in a realistic setting—in any case well below 1/4.

The mechanism for social updating may also be criticized in the following way. If agents' belief states are theories, their beliefs are closed under the consequence relation. So, illustrating with theories for the case of M = 1 (cf. Example 3.2), an agent whose belief state is characterized by the string 1100 is supposed to believe also the propositions coded as 1110, 1101, and 1111. This is not reflected in our current update rule (EHK) and suggests an asymmetric composition of the peer group: for M = 1 and D = 1, an agent A with theory 1111 and an agent B with theory 1100 are not each other's peers according to our current model. However, agent B also ought to believe A's theory, but not vice versa. We may now suggest an alternative way of determining an agent's peer group: by taking into account also those agents that hold a theory which is within distance D of at least one of the consequences of the first agent's theory. Doing so would help to protect agents against updating to the inconsistent theory. However, it also introduces a preference for less informative theories, so it may hamper the agents' chances of finding the (strongest) true theory. Hence, this is a case where different epistemic goals (rationality versus finding the truth) are in direct conflict with each other and selecting the optimal normative model seems to require meta-norms of rationality.

In our previous work (Wenmackers et al., 2012), we have considered the probability of arriving at an opinion profile in which at least one agent adheres to the inconsistent theory, starting out from an opinion profile without any such agent (and assuming a uniform prior over these anonymous profiles). We found this probability to be zero for M = 1. This finding is confirmed in the current study. Nevertheless, by studying the dynamical space in general, we have observed certain trends that help to explain the previously obtained results for the probability of consistent-to-inconsistent updating.

For M = 2, the probability that an agent will arrive at the inconsistent theory, in a population where none have adopted this theory, is non-zero (provided that D > 0 and N > 2). In our previous work, we observed that this probability decreases when more independent issues are considered (that is, when M increases beyond 2). We are now in a better position to explain the𠅎ssentially combinatorial—mechanism behind this finding. Although we have not presented cross-sections for the higher-dimensional case, we can give a qualitative discussion of cases with M > 1. As M increases, the belief space becomes higher-dimensional (tM − 1) and the basin that is attracted by the sink corresponding to consensus on the inconsistency becomes a smaller fraction of its total (hyper-)volume (equal to 1/tM for D = wM). This corresponds to the observation in our previous study that the probability of updating to the inconsistent theory is lowered by forming theories over more independent issues (higher M). For a larger number of agents (higher N), the dimensions of the belief space remain the same, but the opinion profile has access to more points of this space. As a result, the probability of consensus on the inconsistent theory is lower, too this is in line with the earlier findings as well.

For belief spaces with a fixed number of agents (with M = 1 and D > 0), we observed that if the number of agents is even, the midpoint of the edges is accessible and acts as a source (in respect to other points on the edge). This is confirmed by our study of the ODS: the midpoint of an edge belongs to a line separating two or three basins. In the ODS, it also becomes clear that the midpoint on a “single” edge acts as a sink for points from the line between this midpoint and the midpoint of a 𠇍ouble” edge (half of the line for D = 1, all of it for D = 2). Moreover, if the number of agents is a multiple of four, the midpoint of the entire tetrahedron is accessible and acts as a source. In contrast, if the number of agents is a multiple of three, the midpoint of each of the faces is accessible and acts as a source (for D = 1). So, in the case of an even number of agents, there are more fixed points than in the case of an odd number of agents. Taken together, these effects explain the 𠇎ven–odd wobble” in our previous study: the observation that agents have a lower probability of updating to the inconsistent theory in an even-numbered population than in an odd-numbered population of similar size.

Moreover, for fixed M, there is a limited number of these special points, whereas the total number of accessible points in the belief space rises fast when the number of agents, N, increases. Consequently, the number of these special points as compared to the total number of opinion profiles in the hyper-volume decreases when N increases, which explains the attenuation of the wobble for larger populations. If we consider (a face of) the ODS for M = 1 and D > 0 (cf. Figure 6), we see that the majority of opinion densities belong to some basin that is attracted to a sink. However, most of the points that are accessible in the OPS for a relatively small population size do not belong to these basins. Hence, small populations have a relatively high probability of producing delicately balanced opinion profiles, which tend to act as unstable equilibria (sources) and do not lead to full consensus.

Additionally, as the number M of propositions increases, the dimensionality of the belief space increases, as does the absolute number of these special points, but their number as compared to the possible points in the hyper-volume decreases. This explains the earlier observed decrease in the maximal probability of updating to the inconsistent theory as M increases.

While the model studied in this paper is idealized in several respects, it is not completely unrealistic. Even if real agents do not generally compromise with their peers exactly in the way our artificial agents do, real agents do tend to influence each other's belief states, whether consciously or not. Idealized models can give information about such processes, much in the way in which the Ideal Gas Law gives information about the behavior of real gases. Also, there are several ways to make the model more realistic, for instance, as indicated earlier, by providing the agents with direct evidence about the truth, which in our model could be added as a driving force, directed toward a particular theory, or𠅎quivalently𠅊s an external potential directed toward one of the vertices of the ODS, corresponding to consensus on a theory with exactly one non-zero bit.

But even in its present, idealized form, the model we have studied demonstrates that there may be issues of rationality specifically arising from the way or ways we interact epistemically with fellow inquirers. We will be content if this sways some traditional (“individualistic”) epistemologists as well as some psychologists to take the social level into consideration in their studies of rationality. For the latter group, we note that already the current model suggests a number of seemingly worthwhile empirical studies, focusing on how real people influence one another's belief states, on which factors determine whether people regard someone as their peer (in the technical sense used here), and on whether whatever epistemic interactions take place in reality tend to aid the achievement of people's epistemic goals.


Is there a place where I can find inconsistent images? - Psychology

.- The mysteries of the human mind .

- Los misterios de la mente humana.

There is no light at the edge of darkness.

for Our Daily Challenge topic - 'Science.' I will get better pix at end of day. Below shows last year day after I bought it. You can read parts of brain better

It's a pretty hot day outside, temperature being at 39°C. I had been reading biochemistry and also planning to read "Like the Flowing River". Anyway, I had also been researching on empathy and clinical depression.

I wish you well and I hope you are having a great day.

This morning i just couldn’t think of anything clever or amusing for the write up for this piece, so whilst racking my brain I thought i’d have a quick trawl of the interweb to see if i could find any inspiration. It wasn’t looking great until I came across an article about google’s new poetry AI and that's when things started to fall into place. So instead of some well thought out prose I give you some poetry created by a computer after a little nudge in the right direction by myself. I hope you enjoy:

First I fell into an idle bed

Drowning all a feeling with a think

To breathe those flowers upon my head.

He knew that an artist, an marked school,

Brought on its heart, like the distant dew

As if a dog I might paint a fool?

Now if that doesn’t strike a chord i’m pretty sure you are dead inside.

Sometimes. relationships get ill. This is to reflect that part in some that lives through another. Separation, in this case, is the equivalent of death.

As featured in EXPLORE 17 January 2015. Woo!

Making up an interesting title for an image can be an important creative aspect of photography. After all, did famous photographers ever resort to generic or bland labels for their work, or no names at all?

Actually, they often did. Real ordinary titles like “East Coast Fisherman,” “White Radish,” “Nude, Campden Hill, London, 1949,” and simply “Self-portrait.”

So how come these really creative people failed to conjure up a captivating title for some of their most famous photographs? Well, probably because it wasn’t necessary. The image itself was meaningful, powerful, revealing, all on its own. Maybe all they felt they needed to do was indicate the simple facts of where, when, and who, in order to provide a basic context. Then the image did the rest of the talking.

There are some definite advantages to straightforward or no titles at all. It lets viewers explore the image on their own without forcing any particular interpretation. It tosses the image into their lap and encourages them to project themselves into it, creating their own meaning. No title at all can be especially effective. It’s mysterious. It teases, frustrates, challenges, lures the viewer in: “Go ahead. Figure this out.” It’s a presentation of the purely visual with no pretense of words.

On the other hand, titles of some kind are useful handles. Without one, how do you refer to an image? “It’s the shot of the bicycle, not the bicycle in the playground… the other one, you know, the bicycle on the grass, shot from below, through the spokes up at the sky.”

Wouldn’t “Spoked Sky” be easier? Especially in online photo sharing communities, where there are thousands and millions of images, titles will help you organize, identify, and discuss images, as well as make it easier for search engines to find them.

And like I said at the start, titles can be an important part of the creative process. You can use a title to steer the viewer towards ideas that you really want to convey. The title can add a layer of meaning that is not immediately obvious in the photo. A title can even be playful or provocative by contradicting the qualities of the image.

Some titles might pop into your mind right away. You know what the image says for you. In other cases, however, you might have to really think about it. That process can be fascinating, and valuable. You know you like the photo, but may not be sure why. Searching your mind for a title might clarify that for you. It may help you uncover the subconscious feelings, memories, and fantasies that you associate with it. Coming up with a really good title might also help you alter and refine the photo. The title gives you a direction for post processing and image manipulation. It’s an excellent exercise in bringing composition in line with the idea you want to convey.

You’ll know when you have a really good title. It feels right. It “sticks.” Weeks, months, even years later, you’ll remember it. It’s a wedding of meaning and image.

* This image and essay are part of a book on Photographic Psychology that I’m writing within Flickr. Please see the set description.

Yesterday was tee shirt weather. Today it’s cold enough outside that you can see your breath. Even so, the warm colors of spring tulips add a psychology of warmth that’s unmistakable!

Life University (LIFE) believes that in order to educate people, you have to do more than just feed their intellect or teach them critical thinking skills. Additionally, they believe that you have to teach them how to be better human beings by cultivating skills such as emotion regulation.

It's usually next to impossible to get a good photo of my grandson. He can't sit still, and tends to frown at the camera. Until I tried to get a portrait of his mom for work purposes and he decided, of course, he just had to get in there.

Also known as “multiplicity” shots, images involving clones can be comical, intriguing, and even disturbing. As highly self-aware creatures, we humans are fascinated by mirrors and reflections of ourselves, by the idea of having a twin, alter ego, doppleganger, and multiple personalities.

The multiplicity shot is a visual representation of the fact that the psyche is not a homogenously unified entity. The human personality is made up of various parts that sometimes cooperate with each other, and sometimes not. Clone images capture the various ways these different elements of the psyche might interact - what some psychologists call “intrapsychic dynamics.” For example:

- The hidden, unconscious, or dissociated parts of ourselves that operate behind the scenes or behind our backs, without our even being aware of their existence

- The unconscious self that suddenly and unexpected appears, much to our surprise, delight, or shock (see The Unconscious)

- The self that we wish or fear to be

- The contradictions, divisions, or opposites within our psyche

- The “evil” or aggressive qualities within, that we usually suppress

- The parts of ourselves that are in conflict with each other, that oppose, thwart or resist each other (see Inside the Psyche)

- The unknown part of our psyche that acts as a “trickster” who creates unpredictability in our lives (see Prankster)

- The inner wise self that wants to help us, perhaps even the “God within”

- Self acceptance, self love, or narcissism

- Inner confusion and chaos created by ambitions, feelings, and thoughts that are at odds with each other

- The inner parts of our psyche that cooperate with each other, work in unison or in parallel with each other, perhaps aware or unaware of each other’s presence (see Biography)

- The self that is simply aware of itself, of the process of observing itself, perhaps with judgment, or, in a mystical fashion, without any judgment or evaluation (see Infinite Progression)

Multiplicity images tend to be more convincing and intriguing when the clones visibly demonstrate this awareness of and interaction with each other. Otherwise the clones appear as unrelated, somewhat uninteresting duplications of each other. Body language and line of sight can suggest a bond among them, although direct eye-to-eye contact can be difficult to simulate. Humans are exquisitely sensitive to the eyes, so if the eye connection among clones is off, even just a little, the viewer will notice and feel that the simulation is false. The most convincing clones are those that overlap, touch, or engage each other physically, although this effect requires careful planning in the shooting of the photos and skillful editing of the composite image.

One strategy for creativity multiplicity images is rather straightforward. Set the camera on a steady surface, preferably a tripod, and shoot the same scene several times over, each time with the subject in a different pose within that scene and in the spot where you want that subject to appear within the final composite image. In a photo editing program, choose one of the shots as a background, then copy just the subjects from the other shots and paste them into their position in the background photo. The tricky part will be the editing of the edges around the clones so that they blend convincingly into the background photo. Also pay close attention to the shadows cast by the clones. Inconsistent or missing shadows will result in an unrealistic final image. Scenes with even or diffuse, steady light will usually result in fewer complications. Poor edge editing, changing light sources, and problematic shadows will produce anomalous clones that look like they were just pasted into the scene.

In the image at the top of this page, which clones appear least convincing as natives of that shot, and why? Can you guess which one wasn’t cut and pasted?

* This image and essay are part of a book on Photographic Psychology that I’m writing within Flickr. Please see the set description.


Most Read

Lowrie has similar ambitions. "Our guidance shows us buying two more clubs this year and five more clubs next year because with our stock price, we can raise money and we have a pipeline full of potential acquisitions."

There are about 3,600 strip clubs nationwide, Lowrie said. "And from a business point of view, it's all like Las Vegas was in the early '70s. Investors and banks are realizing that like gambling and casinos, adult entertainment and gentlemen's clubs are a legitimate business."

"There's nothing we don't take into account," Langan said. "Club location, nearest competition, the legal environment in a city and zoning laws when we invest.

"Ultimately though," he added, "you want to get into a market and dominate, just like any other business."


This Is Why You Need a "Happy Place"—and Where to Find It

Finding yourself feeling less-than-thrilled with your lot in life is hardly unique. In fact, according to the results of the 2016 Harris Poll Happiness Index, just 31 percent of Americans considered themselves "very happy." However, it's not just a tumultuous political climate or stagnant wages bringing people down: in many cases, it's a lack of optimism about what the future might hold. And while adding zeroes to that paycheck may not be a possibility, there's one simple way to improve your life in an instant: find your happy place.

According to licensed mental health counselor and life coach Dr. Jaime Kulaga, Ph.D., there are few stressors you can't fix if you find your happy place.

"Having a space that you can go to, to center and find clarity, is extremely beneficial. When you step away to a calm space that brings you joy or peacefulness, you allow your mind to destress so that you can make clear minded decisions and see things from alternate perspectives," she says. "Another benefit to having a place where you can escape is that you allow yourself to be more present in the moment. Being present often welcomes in thoughts of gratitude. Gratitude increases overall life happiness and minimizes anxieties and anger."

Here's where things get interesting: Your happy place doesn't even need to be real. If you've got a perfect cabin on a scenic bluff overlooking the ocean that sets your mind right—or even just a bench in a nearby garden where you can cool your head—that's great. But your happy place can merely be an imagined place that exists in your mind—and conjuring images of being there can boost your mood in mere seconds.

According to a study published in the Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, thinking of traveling to a fantastical location and merely planning such a trip in your head can actually increase your happiness more than reminiscing about the actual vacation afterward—suggesting that the fantasy is frequently all you need to make yourself happier in no time.

Here's how to do it

"Start with listing out dreams and goals, and go big," suggests Dr. Kulaga. "Want that bungalow, overlooking crystal clear water with palm trees that have coconuts you drink from? Great! Dream it up. Or, is your dream to walk across a university stage, while hundreds of people are screaming your name and jumping up and down for you as you grab your hard-earned diploma from the Dean of a school? Great! Dream it up. Your happy place is subjective. It is a place that makes your mind smile, calm down, and feel positive. It is a place that is safe, secure, and problem free."

It's not a waste of time. In fact, there could be real health benefits. According to a study published in Evidence-based Complementary and Alternative Medicine, more individuals undergoing chemotherapy who did guided meditations and similar visualization exercises had more improved outcomes than those who didn't. Among the most notable results of the study? While stress continued to increase over the course of treatment among those who didn't participate in these activities, it continued to plummet among those who did. Perhaps more surprising: those who performed the visualization exercises actually experienced less fatigue over the course of treatment, too.

Even if it feels silly to encourage those flights of fancy and retreat to your happy place now, Dr. Kulaga suggests that people don't discount what a positive direction doing so might take your life in. "Know that anything is possible and your 'happy place' can become your permanent reality in this lifetime," she says.

And for more genius ways to lift your spirits, see these 20 Top Tricks from Therapists on Finding Happiness.

To discover more amazing secrets about living your best life, click here to follow us on Instagram!


Discussion

The results of Experiment 1 indicate that observers process scene semantics, even when doing so is irrelevant to their task. As mentioned earlier, scene semantics are irrelevant for the completion of this search task because, first, the identity of the scene does not provide information about the position of the target. Second, the visual dissimilarity between critical objects and the target minimizes the need to fully identify the objects. On top of object and scene identification, object and scene identities need to be integrated to affect behavior another processing step that would seem unnecessary or even counterproductive because object–scene relations are irrelevant to the letter search and the instruction is to search fast. Following the logic that both identification and integration are necessary to notice a scene-object mismatch, we assume that longer gaze durations on semantically inconsistent objects (i.e., mismatches) are a good indicator that scene as well as object identity processing are taking place. Participants spent more time fixating the semantically inconsistent objects than the consistent objects. This is reflected in longer total dwell times, more fixations, and longer mean fixation durations. The difference between conditions was not reflected in RTs, even though numerically RTs were on average prolonged by about 250 ms. Varying complexity and clutter in the scene, plus varying conspicuity of the target from scene to scene, might cause variance in target-absent decision times (Wolfe, 2012) larger than differences because of object consistency.

In this experiment we were mostly interested in measures upon object fixation. An ongoing debate in scene-perception literature concerns whether semantically inconsistent objects also attract gaze, indicating semantic processing in visual periphery. Even though we find earlier first fixations of semantically inconsistent objects, we refrain from drawing strong conclusions from this about attention attraction because the stimuli used were not controlled for distance to the initial fixation dot. In addition, critical objects were relatively large and therefore more easily recognizable in the visual periphery, even when further away from initial fixation.

After experimental sessions, as a check of how noticeable the semantic inconsistencies had been to participants during their search task, we asked each participant, “Did you notice anything?” Most responded that there were “odd objects” in some of the images. When asked how many they had noticed, most participants indicated “a few” or named one or two examples. In Experiment 2, we aimed to get a better grip on how noticeable the semantic inconsistencies were to participants by testing their memory for the critical objects.


Conclusion

Heroes loom large as exemplars of morality. They often embody virtues that we wish to express in our lives. Our findings suggest that heroic images𠄾ven relatively subtle images of superheroes–may increase one’s intentions to help and actual helping behavior. As superheroes become an increasing large and accessible part of the symbolic cultural narrative, their role in inspiring virtuous and meaningful lives may become more robust. As this occurs, we may, as Mark Twain wrote, continue our fascination with, and perhaps even worship of, heroes.


Neurological Rehabilitation

Paul J. Eslinger , . Freeman M. Chakara , in Handbook of Clinical Neurology , 2013

Social cognition and theory of mind

In several EF models, social cognition is considered an important dimension that incorporates interpersonal processes such as theory of mind and empathy. Since such processes require problem solving such as inferential and relational reasoning , decision-making, and context-specific rules and actions, there is a substantial role for EF resources in the acquisition and application of social knowledge and actions, hence the term social executors ( Eslinger et al., 1995 ). Although assessment instruments for social cognition are fairly limited, there has been gradual emergence of standardized measures and behavioral inventories to provide clinicians with a combination of objective and survey measures. These measures have become increasingly important because of the puzzling dissociations that may be evident after orbitofrontal lesions that leave measured intellect (and even EF measures described above) unaffected but profoundly impair social adaptation in real-world settings. This gap can be addressed by some of the following measures and inventories:

Theory of Mind: First and second order beliefs in theory of mind vignettes that require judgment of what an individual is thinking in a particular situation (first order belief), and what another person believes that individual is thinking when he is and is not privy to certain situational information (second order beliefs).

Social Judgment: Guilford's Cartoon Predictions test is an example of presenting a social dilemma in pictured cartoon form, with patients required to choose the next most likely (appropriate) action to solve the dilemma from among three choices ( Eslinger et al., 2007 ).

Empathy: The Interpersonal Reactivity Index ( Davis, 1994 ) provides a standardized survey measure of cognitive (i.e., perspective-taking) and affective (emotional concern/sharing) realms of empathy.


Elements of Murdoch’s moral psychology

When Murdoch discusses moral psychology, the expression she sometimes uses is that of a picture of the soul. She took herself to be laying out a picture of the soul different from that of her contemporaries. I shall list some important elements in her moral psychology. They are interdependent, and I have not tried to list them in an order which reflects their significance.

1.

Thinking which is part of our moral life goes on a very great deal of the time. (In her later work, Murdoch held that all consciousness is morally coloured.) It is not limited to the considering of “situations” taken to present a person with some moral choice or moral demand, and of principles capable of enabling us to respond to such “situations.” The idea of a “moral agent” as someone who is occasionally confronted by some situation that she can recognise to be a “moral situation” or one demanding a moral choice is repudiated by Murdoch. What is involved in moral life and thought is not tied by Murdoch to a conception of moral agency of a kind which would make observable action and choice central to moral psychology in the way they are for most moral philosophers.

2.

Thinking can be part of moral life without being tied in any direct way to observable action and choice. It may be directed toward getting a true and just understanding of something. Murdoch’s most famous example is meant to illustrate this point: the example of the mother-in-law, M, who comes to see her daughter-in-law, D, more justly. This is a moral achievement even if D is dead, and there is no question how M will go on to treat her, and even if M’s behaviour toward the girl has always been exemplary.

While this example is meant to illustrate how we can come to a just view, Murdoch’s discussion makes plain that a slightly changed version of the same example could illustrate someone deluding herself, trying to save herself from recognition of how unfortunate her son has been in his marriage. If thinking that gives us a truer view of reality is a moral achievement, thinking that takes us further into fantasy is a moral failure.

3.

Imaginative elements are important in moral life in many and various kinds of way. A person’s moral life might, for example, be penetrated by the idea that she has a special destiny, or that she is under a kind of curse such fables may enter the person’s practical life or in other cases might be mere decoration. Another kind of way in which imagination enters moral life is in the role which may be given to some individual as a source of moral inspiration.

Imagination is involved in the conceptual activities which shape our understanding of the world and life. Take the example she gives in “Vision and Choice in Morality” of people who “emphasise the inexhaustible detail of the world, the endlessness of the task of understanding,” which illustrates how imagination is involved in the shaping of a fundamental moral attitude. The inexhaustibility of the detail of the world is not, as it were, there to be established by some argument, but is part of an imaginative vision of the world. Any far-reaching moral or moral-religious concept is grasped imaginatively, and not all at once such concepts are then capable of “stirring” our practical thinking at deep levels. (Though we should note that what can be meant by the term “concept” is one of the debatable matters here. A fundamental mode of understanding of the world or life is exactly the sort of thing Murdoch treats as a central case of a moral concept, but it wouldn’t be a concept at all on many views.)

4.

Moral life is not primarily a matter of choices. The more one has been attentive to reality, the less one will find oneself aware of having to make a choice. Frequently it will simply be clear what needs to be done, and one no more thinks of there being a choice than one takes oneself to be making choices as one drives along a road with numerous roads branching off which do not go where one is heading. This way of thinking does not involve a denial of freedom, but places freedom at a different point, not at the point of choosing.

5.

The determinants of action are far more complex than they are taken to be by most contemporary moral philosophers. There is no single pattern which is the pattern of voluntary action, or of characteristically human action, or of moral action rather, the determinants of action, the things that actually motivate, emerge from various levels (conscious or relatively submerged) of thought, feeling, memory.

Here is how an example can be drawn from Murdoch: she writes of how we evade the idea of death, and how tragedy “must contain some dreadful vision of the reality and significance of death.” An imaginative facing, at some time, of death, a refusal of evasion, can then enter what we think and how we act at some later time in our lives, perhaps in our not being tempted by some fantasy, or in resistance to the seduction of power. Such an idea of how imaginative activity at one time can shape moral life at a later time is essential to Murdoch’s moral psychology. But again, one should note that a similar process can work in the morally opposite direction, when the willingness to go along with a cheap or evasive or corrupt understanding of something shapes how we think and act later.

Also important in Murdoch’s ideas about the determinants of action is desire, understood to be properly subjected to a kind of “training” through moral life ― that is, through our coming to see reality clearly and justly. This kind of modification of desire is a gradual business. Murdoch doesn’t deny possible clashes of duty and inclination, but that sort of episode, because it is highly visible and easily portrayed in fiction, may distract attention from what she plainly takes to be the more important kind of case, in which the whole structure of desire in a person may gradually shift so that good action occurs without any felt conflict or without even the sense of a choice having to be made.

Murdoch emphasises how the attempt to reach understanding of something, to see clearly something outside the self, can shape a person’s pattern of desire and thus make available sources of energy that can motivate actions. The “training” of desire, as Murdoch understands it, comes about in part through our use of moral concepts ― such as that of envy, or malice, or generosity.

There is an important connection here with her ideas about imagination: for concepts illuminate and shape our moral world. If good actions can be attractive, it is in part through the imaginative power of the concepts we can deploy in thinking and seeing the reality in which we need to act. The world in which we act is not motivationally inert but is rather characterised by magnetic fields, as it were, in which actions can be attractive to us, through the kind of place they have in the world as shaped already by perception and by fantasy or imagination ― that is, in ways which have already involved activity on our part.

It is no part of Murdoch’s view of the determinants of action to deny the existence of the kinds of case that tend to be prominently in view in most moral philosophy, of actions done for public reasons. It is rather that she regards such cases as simply among the kinds of case there can be, and insists on the great variety of possible kinds of case. (The methodology here is Wittgensteinian: there is nothing the matter with the way philosophers have described a type of case their mistake is to have taken a particular kind of case and to have supposed that, in describing it, they were describing the entire field rather than one part of it.)

5a.

Murdoch’s conception of the determinants of action involves dropping the familiar imagery that accompanies much philosophical thinking about “the will”: the image of a setting of something into motion, an image which then carries along with it the need to ask questions about whether reason can provide the impetus, or only desire or what. One of the alternative images used by Murdoch is that of a person’s moral being as a “fabric” which shows itself in the person’s overt actions, but also in her thoughts, jokes, patterns of attention, fantasies, imaginative explorations and a thousand other things.

The imagery of “the will” fits closely with the idea that one could, at least in principle, sort what goes on in the soul into active bits and passive bits, things we genuinely do and things which are properly happenings to us rather than doings and then the active bits can themselves be sorted into those belonging to practical life and those belonging on the theoretical side. The alternative image of the fabric of being suggests that active and passive are mixed together in far more complex ways than would allow our desire for a relatively tidy theory to be satisfied.

The picture of “the will” lays stress on certain particular sorts of case of determination of action (though the sorts of case which are stressed depend on the particular theory), and can be misleading by occluding other sorts of case, by encouraging us to stop reflection just where it should continue, and by creating the appearance of problems about the determination of the will ― problems that depend on the idea of there being some very small number of basic patterns, rather than an indefinitely large number of ways, many of them “obscure and complicated,” in which we come to act.

The idea of the will in philosophy, as belonging to the theory of action, leads us to ignore the kind of activity and effort which may be involved in forming beliefs about people: one may recognise that one finds it hard to trust someone, for example, and that one needs to try to do so one might try to free oneself from some habitually used picture.

6.

One of the two central concepts in Murdoch’s rethinking of moral psychology is attention. As she writes in “The Idea of Perfection”: “I can only choose within the world I can see, in the moral sense of ‘see’ which implies that clear vision is a result of moral imagination and moral effort.” The notion of attention is crucial in Murdoch’s repudiation of the whole idea of a separation between the theoretical realm and the practical. Her difference from mainstream moral philosophy over the separation between theoretical and practical thinking shapes her conception of moral psychology. The denial that moral thought is concerned centrally with situations that confront one with a moral choice is tied to her idea that what moral life demands is not primarily getting choices right, but achieving in a piecemeal way a clarity of vision in the ideal sort of case, such a perception of reality would lead to appropriate action.

7.

The other central concept in the rethinking of moral psychology is love. Like the concept of attention, it is important in the repudiation of a divide between the theoretical and practical realms: the concept of knowledge, relevant to moral life, is of knowledge available through loving attention ― knowledge which is responsive to the reality of things outside of one’s self. Although there are passages where Murdoch simply identifies love with perception of the reality of what lies outside the self, she elsewhere recognises the variety of forms love takes, which include forms of love that feed off fantasy.

8.

Moral differences between people go much deeper than simply the application of moral concepts in different ways to the same world. The conceptual activities of the mind and the spirit in which we see the world make us who we are, morally speaking two people may not, in the relevant sense, inhabit the same world.

9.

Murdoch’s understanding of reason was partly shaped by her contemporaries, and in particular by Stuart Hampshire, whose views she reacted against. She took his account of the relation between reason and will to be extremely widespread, and she rejects his account of rationality as concerned with taking in the intersubjectively available facts ― an activity which supposedly then leaves room for will to operate. Arguing against this view, but making a limited kind of use of the notion of will in her argument, Murdoch insists that will is not separable from reason (here taken to be the faculty through which we form beliefs), since an activity of the will is involved in our coming to see reality and will can influence belief for the worse as well.

She doesn’t discuss any conception of the will as practical reason in a Kantian sense. There is, however, a conception of reason of a different sort in her treatment of Plato, for example in the idea that mathematics is “good for the soul,” in making for an attachment to truth, a capacity to focus on what is real, what is outside the self.

10.

Murdoch allows for the significance of moral rules, of a sphere of obligation and of a sense of duty in moral upbringing and in the moral life of adults, but has relatively little interest in the details of how rules are brought into contact with choice, or the role which rules may have in practical reasoning. She does not see the context of choice as needing to be illuminated by a theoretical regimentation, so that some structure of reasoning could in principle be discerned, at least implicitly, in any choice. She explicitly rejects any conception of the application of rules which would see them as brought into contact with “the facts,” conceived to be available in some morally neutral way. The character which a rule has in a person’s moral life depends on how it connects with his understanding of life, including social life: a rule may be a mere remnant of past training, or instead integrated with his knowledge, his capacity to see and respond to reality.

11.

Murdoch gives an important place to freedom while rejecting a dualism of active and passive elements in our psychology. Although there is no dualism, a contrast important for her picture of the soul is that between egoistic thinking, which has a kind of mechanical or closed-in-on-itself character, and the activity of attempting to reach truth, which is particularly hard to describe, because it is essentially various in the forms it takes: the working over of thoughts, perceptions, images, attachments, feelings. Its openness, and its being the site of freedom, are inseparable from the variety of the ways in which we can come to see or understand things better.

Murdoch pointed out what she took to be misleading or positively wrong in the ideas about freedom which analytic and continental philosophers had put forward. She repeatedly criticised conceptions of freedom that tie it to the moment of action she saw such conceptions as dependent on the idea of the “hard” world of facts, thought of as forming the background to an exercise of the will.

Murdoch’s own alternative conception of freedom ties it closely to the capacity for attention ― a capacity which may be exercised in a great variety of ways, in all sorts of circumstances, not specially when we need to decide what to do. This notion of freedom thus also ties it closely to knowledge, achievable through efforts of attention, attempts to counteract dishonest thinking, and to be more patient and just in thought and perception. Murdoch’s understanding of freedom ties it also to the idea that there is freedom “to see the world differently,” to work with fundamentally different conceptualisations of things.

12.

Virtue, too, is tied closely to knowledge and to attention to what lies outside the ego. Murdoch emphasises the importance of there being a variety of virtues, but also sees them as having an underlying unity which may nevertheless be difficult to discern. She connects the virtues with the idea of a person’s “fabric of being,” the image suggesting something which is continuous, into which various strands are woven, something which has various patterns in it. The image also allows for the pattern of courage in one person’s fabric to be quite distinct from the pattern of courage in someone else’s fabric. The characteristics of the fabric are present as much in habits of thought and feeling as in overt action.

13.

Murdoch criticised the ideas of her contemporaries about concepts in general and about moral concepts in particular. She did not see having a concept as basically a matter of being able to recognise and discriminate a pattern in things. The prevalent idea when she began writing about philosophy was that a concept was a way of using a word. This was useful as far as it went, she thought, but it left out quite different sorts of case, of great philosophical interest.

What Murdoch emphasises is our capacity to develop through language and especially through the use of metaphor and “semi-sensible” pictures some way of making sense of things. Modes of recognition and discrimination of things are included, but the range of cases she considers is much wider, and the recognition/discrimination cases fall into place only as relatively subsidiary kinds of case. The important moral concepts, like truth, will have great internal complexity, and this kind of complexity is important in her ideas about fundamental differences of moral vision.

Differences of moral vision and differences of concept are closely tied. The range of what she would consider a moral concept is much greater than what most philosophers would consider a moral concept: thus, for example, the twentieth-century idea of a “factual disagreement” would count for her as a moral concept, one that plays a role in a moral vision of the nature and situation of human beings. So too the idea of the separability of fact and value. The work done by a concept, on her view, is quite different from what it would be in many accounts. The concept of love, for instance, may be an organising concept in someone’s life, and thus is not primarily to be understood as a way of picking out what would be a case of love, or a case of acting lovingly, and what would not.

Murdoch’s understanding of the role of the concept certainly includes its use in (for example) thinking about whether what one feels, what someone else feels, is indeed love, but the role of the concept in her ethics goes much further than that. It is an essential element in a moral vision, and makes it possible to bring together in complex ways ideas about knowledge, attention, perception, freedom and action.

Murdoch’s idea of organising concepts or conceptual configurations, which structure someone’s understanding, is at the heart of her rejection of the usual ideas about the distinction between fact and value. The “fact-value” picture of the world is tied to an idea of moral concepts as applying to things or situations by supervening on the non-moral facts. That picture is expressive of a conceptual configuration, a “type of moral attitude” it is a sort of conceptual configuration that works to keep from view its own role in our thought.


Watch the video: Trudy and the Romance - Is There A Place I Can Go - Vevo dscvr Live (July 2022).


Comments:

  1. Terrys

    I apologise, but, in my opinion, you are not right. Let's discuss.

  2. Kazirisar

    To think only!

  3. Malahn

    This very good phrase has to be precisely on purpose

  4. Kenric

    Personal messages at all go today?

  5. Mahmoud

    I'm sorry, but I think you are making a mistake. I can defend my position.

  6. Kareem

    Are there more options?



Write a message